This paper examines the current wave of US bilateral agreements with respect to their strategic and political value at the plurilateral level. The US government has explicitly recognized its objective of leveraging bilateral agreements in order to influence regional and multilateral negotiations. Although it may be too early to assess the full effectiveness of this US strategy, the paper argues that there are clear signs that the exploitation of bilateral agreements will not independently achieve the goal of strengthening plurilateral patent norms. This finding is supported by an assessment of six potential roads from bilateralism to plurilateralism: chain reaction, pressure for inclusion, coalition building, emulation, legal interpretation, and adherence. The assertion that bilateral trade deals have a great impact on international patent lawmaking, made both by proponents and critics of TRIPs-Plus agreements, is unsubstantiated. The author concludes that the US Government Accountability Office and Congress are justified in questioning whether the negotiation of these bilateral agreements, at least in the realm of IP law, is a wise investment of US Trade Representative's resources.
2006; Mayne, 2004; Price, 2004; Roffe, 2004; Roffe and Spennemann, 2006; Rossi, 2006; VivasEugui, 2003) . The increased pace at which bilateral agreements have been concluded in the past decade is thought to undermine the legitimacy of multilateralism. The shift to bilateral negotiations when multilateral negotiations are gridlocked has been described as a "grotesque" means for making gains that could not be achieved at multilateral negotiating tables (GRAIN, 2001 , p. 7).
Proponents and critics of bilateral agreements agree on one point: their conclusion is not, for the US government, a goal in itself, but a means towards increased revenues for patent holders. One can wonder, then, why the US has not signed bilateral agreements with the countries that most seriously threaten the interests of American IP Right (IPR) holders, such as China, Russia, Egypt and India. These and other countries are considered by the US administration as major counterfeiting countries and have been placed on the US "301 Priority Watch List" (USTR, 2007) . Most of them were put under pressure and have agreed to sign bilateral memoranda of understanding on IP with the US. However, none of them were invited by the US government to sign a formal bilateral treaty, legally binding in international law.
It is also surprising that, in the post-TRIPs period, the US has not pursued bilateral negotiations with its major economic partners. With the high volume of trade and investment flows between developed countries, even small discrepancies in patent standards could represent large transaction costs. However, to date the US has not negotiated harmonized patent standards with the European Union or Japan outside of multilateral fora. These omissions beg the question as to whether US investment in time, political capital, and human resources in creating complex legal structures with countries like Dominican Republic and Bahrain, that are neither major trading partners nor major counterfeiters, is worthwhile?
Peter Drahos (2003) explains the US strategy by locating the current shift to bilateralism within a cycle of negotiation. Drahos suggests that bilateral agreements are supposed to lead to regional agreements, which ultimately support increased protection that states previously did not agree to at the multilateral level. Drahos emphasizes that the US is in the bilateral stage of this cycle, seeking to use bilaterals in a manner that will ultimately "ratchet up" IP protections at a multilateral level. Santo Domingo and Port of Spain are stopovers on the way to Paris, Moscow, and Beijing. Seen from this perspective, a bilateral agreement with the smallest economy among World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) members could provide major strategic value.
In fact, the US government has explicitly recognized its objective of leveraging bilateral agreements in order to influence regional and multilateral agreements. This strategy was called "competitive liberalization" by the former US Trade Representative (USTR), Robert Zoellick:
"By moving forward simultaneously on multiple fronts, the United States can […] create a fresh political dynamic by putting free trade on the offensive." (GAO, 2004, p. 57 ) A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report later clarified that one of the key criteria in selecting an FTA partner was its capacity to influence other countries (2004, p. 7-11) . Towards this end, the US has spread its geographical breadth, enabling it to establish regional 'poles' that can provide bases which act as catalysts for regional or multilateral initiatives (GAO, 2004, pp. 8-9) . As a result, in the two years that followed the adoption of the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) by Congress, the US signed FTAs with countries in Asia, Oceania, Africa, the Middle East, South America and Central America.
The historical development of international IP law supports the argument that bilateral agreements can serve as building blocks for subsequent plurilateral (regional or multilateral) agreements. Bilateral IP agreements that were negotiated in the 19 th century acted as models for drafting provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property in 1883 (Gervais, 2002, pp. 234-5; Okediji, 2004, p. 133; Yu, 2004, p. 14) . A century later, US bilateral negotiations under the so-called "Super 301" mechanism, threatening developing countries of unilateral trade sanctions, also played a crucial role in reaching US objectives in TRIPs (Drahos, 2003b, p. 104; Sell, 2003, p. 108.) This paper offers a preliminary examination of the current wave of US bilateral agreements with respect to their strategic value at the plurilateral level. Although it may be too early to assess the full effectiveness of the US strategy, it argues that there are clear signs that the exploitation of bilateral agreements will not independently achieve the goal of strengthening multilateral patent norms. Thus far, more than a decade of active bilateralism has not produced preferred results for the US. This paper therefore argues that the assertion that bilateral trade deals have a great impact on international patent lawmaking, both by proponents and critics, is unsubstantiated. 
The Domino Effect
The broadest goal of bilateralism in the US playbook is to generate a measurable effect beyond the targeted country. One way to achieve this goal is the creation of a chain reaction, whereby bilateral agreements create a domino effect that transplants US patent norms beyond the original members. As the former USTR Robert Zoellick explained, the "idea is to start out with the leading reformers [...] and then try to connect others to it over time" (Inside US Trade, 2003) .
The hope is for the new partners to actively negotiate similar provisions in their treaties with third
countries. An example of a chain reaction through bilateral agreements from the pre-TRIPs period is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) requirement that Mexico give effect to the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV)
convention. Subsequent to signing on to NAFTA, Mexico imposed the same requirement on Bolivia, a non-party to the UPOV convention.
While a chain reaction would evidently benefit the US, the motivations for its partners to transplant US patent norms to third countries are less obvious. Two such incentives are suggested. The first results from the TRIPs Most Favored Nation provision (Art. 4), which states that members must offer "immediately and unconditionally" any enhanced protections to nationals of any other member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Instead of offering these enhanced protections without any concession from third countries, partner states might try to conclude reciprocal agreements in order to maintain a level playing field and prevent neighbouring countries from gaining a competitive advantage as a result of weaker patent protection.
Second, they might be subject to a phenomenon described by Ikenberry and Kupchan as "socialization by external inducements" (1990, p. 291) . This socialization, originating from the institutionalized cooperation formalized in bilateral agreements, leads the elites of developing countries to believe that US norms are in their best interest. This change in belief can result from technical assistance, capacity building programs, or the frequent contacts with foreign authorities that usually follow the signature of a FTA. Tellingly, the US Government has noted that "more and more of our trading partners are coming to understand that their future growth and development depends in large part on […] strong intellectual property protection" (Larson, 2002) .
The US could reasonably have expected that signing bilateral treaties with certain chosen partners would have important chain reaction potential. As shown in Table 1 , bilateral treaties negotiated during the last decade coincided with other regional or bilateral discussions on IP from which the US was absent. was not however, the only one pursued by the US, as will be seen in the next section.
The Club Effect
Bilateral trade agreements could create a "pressure for inclusion" (Lawrence, 1996) . This pressure acts as an incentive for third parties to join existing treaties to benefit from privileged trade access to the US market. It originates from a prisoner dilemma situation where developing countries believe they secure gains from acting collectively. As a group and in absolute terms, they are better off rejecting bilateral trade agreements that include TRIPs-Plus provisions.
However, a breach in the alliance compels neighbouring and competing countries to join the existing one. Ultimately, all the other developing countries could be forced to follow in order to catch up with this comparative trade advantage (Baldwin, 1997; Guzman, 1998) .
Moreover, it is thought that countries without a trade partnership with the US are more likely to endorse American norms if they are already adopted by other countries. The pre-existence of an agreement is a reassuring signal that joining the club is rational and will not seriously harm the economy. For example, in the 1980s, Mexico was amongst a number of countries that offered weak or no IP protection for pharmaceutical products. Once becoming party to NAFTA, however, Mexico sent letters of reassurance to developing countries encouraging the acceptance of US norms in the context of the TRIPs negotiation (Rein, 2001, p. 382) .
In this context, the US government expected that third countries might eventually want to join its bilateral agreements. In particular, it hoped that treaties concluded with Morocco, Oman, and Existing bilateral agreements will likely remain in their current form rather than expanding their parties and evolving toward plurilateralism.
The Coalition Effect
Bilateral agreements can also be used to create strategic alliances of like-minded countries in multilateral settings. From this perspective, bilateral agreements act cumulatively towards a single beneficial objective. By persuading more countries to accept its stringent IPR norms, the US hopes a critical mass of countries in multilateral fora, namely the WTO and WIPO, will support new international standards (Krikorian and Szymkowiak, 2007) . This is consistent with the USTR observation that the US "very best allies for a strong Doha Round have been current and former [free trade] partners" (Rayasam, 2006, p. 22) .
By expanding and strengthening its coalition, the US simultaneously introduces division in developing countries' coalitions, such as the African Group, the Mega-diverse Countries and the Friends of Development (GAO, 2004, p. 9) . Following this line of argument, some academics, such as Mohammed El Said, worry that bilateral agreements will result in breaking the resistance of developing countries in Geneva "since countries which are committing themselves to TRIPs- and that the WTO was a "more appropriate forum" (Gerhardsen, 2006) .
Another indication of US reliance on its bilateral partners as allies is the negotiation of the FTAA. The expectation of support was apparent given that the US considered a commitment to FTAA negotiations an important criterion for its selection of trade partners (GAO, 2004, p. 8) .
Between the first Summit of the Americas in 1994, which commenced the FTAA talks, and the Hence, when Brazil opposed the US stance on IP, the latter launched a regional offensive against
Brazil which felt itself increasingly isolated. If one views the FTAA as a regional vehicle towards achieving stronger IP protections at the multilateral level (OECD, 2003, p. 112; Oliva, 2003) , then the centrality of bilateral negotiations as a strategic tool for the US becomes apparent.
However, the US investment in building strategic alliances failed to produce the sought-after results. The relationships fostered by the US did not secure an international consensus on US priorities. Indeed, the SPLT negotiations are stagnating. Similarly, the FTAA negotiation did not culminate in an agreement, with differences over IP norms a chief point of contention between Brazil and the US.
Not only were bilateral partnerships insufficient to securing American regional or multilateral ambitions, but some of their allies moved contrary to US interests. Notably, several US partners supported the Resolution WHA60.30 passed in May 2007. This resolution empowered the WHO to provide technical assistance to states that wish to use trade law as a mechanism for improving access to medicines. These partners moved forward in examining the relationship between IP and public health even though American negotiators walked out twice during negotiations and pressured their bilateral partners to divorce technical IP discussion from those relating to health .
In the area of genetic resources, Peru, which is an FTA partner with the US, has been one of the most active members at the TRIPs Council and has opposed the US position on several 
The Emulation Effect
Former USTR Kantor believes that "many U.S. trading partners have recognized -and this has been reflected in their trade negotiations with the United States -[…] that strong intellectual property protections attract foreign investment into their countries" (Kantor, 2005) . The US presents these success stories as "models to follow," wherein social and economic benefits are promoted to subsequent negotiating partners to persuade them to adopt similar IP norms in order to attract similar investment flows and foster technological developments (Schott, 2004, p. 372) .
While some precedent may be necessary during the initial stage to convince sceptics and critics, it is hoped that, in a second wave, third countries will voluntarily and unilaterally adopt similar norms, or, at a minimum, be less resistant to US proposals. 
The Interpretative Effect
Bilateral agreements can arguably be employed as interpretative tools for existing multilateral agreements. More specifically, it has been proposed that in future disputes over provisions of The view that FTAs could be used to interpret TRIPs is not only expressed by interested lobby groups, but also by concerned academics. Several have noted that the WTO agreements should not be interpreted in "clinical isolation from public international law" (United States-Gasoline, 1996, p. 16) and consider harmonization efforts in other fora positively (Trachtman, 2006) . On the specific issue of IP, Ruth Okedji expressed worries that the norms comprised in bilateral treaties will form the context for interpreting treaties to which the US is a signatory (2001, pp. (1969) provides, for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty, that the context comprises "any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties" and that "any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty" shall be taken into account (Art. 31). David Vaver (2003) offers an interesting example when he argues that the higher the number of FTAs imposing the patentability of business methods on states, the more inclined the WTO special groups will be to consider business methods as an "invention" under TRIPs. Moreover, non-WTO awards resulting from disputes over bilateral agreements "may prove useful as guidance, even path breaking in legal theory or rationale, for WTO panels and the Appellate Body" (Bhala, 2007, p. 84) .
602-4). Indeed, the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
Two cases brought before the DSB provide some insight on the applicability of this strategy. provision indicates that WTO Members wanted to retain strict control over the modification of the rules that they had agreed to and did not wish the meaning of rules to be changed in any other way (p. 61). Additionally, the Panel noted that the requirements for establishing "subsequent practice" would be difficult to satisfy in practice due to the fact that, according to the wording of the general rule, a "subsequent practice" must establish a tacit agreement between all parties (p.
61).
Moreover, even if states come to an agreement on the interpretation of an unclear provision in a multilateral treaty during the dispute-settlement process, that interpretation has limited application. Agreements made between states when a multilateral provision is unclear only apply to the dispute in question and between the states directly involved (Rhodes, 2000, pp. 555-556 ).
The situation might be different if a large proportion of WTO members had agreed to a specific provision in bilateral agreements and enforced it domestically. Peter Yu considers that the provisions contained in bilateral agreements could eventually create new customary international norms (2004, p. 397 ). This could occur only if a sufficient number of countries expressly and consistently recognize these provisions as legal norms governing their state's conduct. In a bilateral dispute settlement process, the US would then be in a position to ask a third country to comply with these new norms of international customary law.
However, before this can happen, several conditions must be met. Indeed, the behavior of states may only be considered customary law when it fulfils two chief conditions: it must reflect the general practice of states, and states must believe that there is a legal obligation to conduct themselves in such a manner (Kindred et al., 2006, p. 148) . Presently, the more stringent IP norms imposed through FTAs do not meet these two criteria. The first condition is not fulfilled as those norms are not sufficiently "numerous, general, constant, and uniform" in their application.
When one considers the massive rejection of the more stringent IP norms by several countries, in addition to the harsh criticisms of TRIPs-Plus agreements expressed by some delegations at WIPO and at the WHO, one can conclude that there is no belief that there is a legal obligation to respect those norms. Several countries that enhanced their patent protection did so to respond to economical and political pressure, not to comply with an emerging customary norm. Therefore, US bilateral agreements are unlikely to serve as the basis for new interpretations of existing multilateral agreements or new customary international norms.
The Adherence Effect
Little success, if any, can be attributed to the use of bilateral agreements as strategic tools to create chain links, coalitions of the like-minded, models to follow, new interpretation of multilateral treaties, or customary international law. They can, however, reinforce their IP-related multilateral cousins by requiring signatories to become party. Indeed, a number of the US FTAs require signatories to adhere to multilateral treaties that are not mentioned in TRIPs. In this manner, the US is harmonizing the trade environment to favor a smooth transition towards stronger IP protections at the multilateral level. 14.1.2). In certain situations this requirement was not onerous as the partner was already party to the PCT. However, in the case of at least seven FTAs, this provision requires the further compliance of the US partner.
The US has increasingly required undertakings from partners to the Patent Law Treaty (PLT). Bahrain, used progressively stronger language. None of the bilateral treaties, however, require ratification of the PLT. This may be explained by the fact that the US itself has still not ratified the PLT. Nonetheless, by referring to the PLT in its recent bilateral treaties, it has supported the diffusion, the momentum and coming into force of this treaty.
Fourth, of the developing countries that recently joined UPOV, many did so after concluding a bilateral treaty with the US (Table 2 ). This suggests that several countries may have joined 
Concluding remarks
Through the use of bilateral agreements, the US has sought to create a more stringent patent protection system than that stipulated in TRIPs. USTR Schwab epitomizes the overall objective of bilateral negotiations which "develop a precedent that could at some point be translated in a multilateral setting" (Rayasam, 2006, p. 22) . This reality has, as a consequence, generated a great deal of negative commentary. The main thrust of this backlash is concerned that the US government is using bilateral agreements as vehicles in perpetuating its hegemony over the international patent regime.
This paper examined the current wave of bilateral agreements through the lens of six mechanisms that could give rise to a strategic advantage for the US. We conclude that, for the most part, the above claim must be nuanced. To date, US efforts to use bilateral agreements as tools for reforming the international IP regime beyond the specific targeted countries seem to have failed.
Only in its objective of promoting the accession to existing multilateral agreements has the US demonstrated tangible results.
Moreover, the legitimacy of imposing TRIPs-plus obligations on bilateral partners is being challenged within the US government. In the US Congress, it has been argued that IP provisions On the whole, bilateral agreements have been successful in strengthening domestic IP protection in relatively limited circumstances. None of these cases involve major trading partners or major counterfeiters. Further, they have contributed to the anti-development reputation of the US government in a time when it is seeking support to conclude the Doha Round at the WTO.
Instead of leveraging multilateral negotiations, bilateral agreements have created instability and fragmentation, among WTO members and within the US Congress, which could ultimately damage the bargaining position of the USTR.
Given these failures, it may be prudent for Congress and the American public to assess whether resources that are being dedicated to bilateral negotiations could be better allocated. For example, those same resources may be more efficiently spent on building multilateral relations, negotiating with European countries or providing enforcement support in countries known as major sources of counterfeit goods (Schott, 2004, p. 377) . US failures also suggest that the EU, Switzerland, Japan and other states would not benefit from imitating the US model for negotiating FTAs in the area of IP.
There also exists an open question as to why this strategy failed. Although developing countries might not have interest in unilaterally implementing TRIPs-plus provisions, they certainly have an interest, once they have signed a FTA with US, in seeing competitors adopting similar constrains. One explanation is that US partners lack the necessary incentive, i.e. a strong internal market, to duplicate the US strategy of using trade to promote strong IP standards. An alternative explanation is that the impact of the US bilateral strategy will only be noticeable in the following years. One decade of active bilateralism might not be enough to fully appreciate its dynamic effects on regional and multilateral negotiations. The multilateralization of Cordell Hull's vision of international trade law, for example, was only noticeable with the GATT of 1947, 13 years after the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934, after a period of intense bilateralism (Haggard, 1988) .
Recent developments with the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) project indicate that it could soon become the first tangible success of the US bilateral strategy. Although little is known on the substance of the ACTA project, many suspect that it will be a free-standing plurilateral agreement that will include more stringent patent protection norms than those stipulated under TRIPs (Sell, 2008) . Interestingly, nearly half of the parties that participate at the last ACTA negotiation held in Washington on July 30-31 2008 were FTA partners with the US.
One wonders whether Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Singapore, and the United Arab
Emirates would have actively participated in the ACTA process if they had not signed a FTA with the US or were not in the process of negotiating such a bilateral agreement. If an extensive ACTA is made possible by the relations developed through bilateral agreements, it will constitute the first success for the US bilateral strategy. So far, bilateralism has brought more drawbacks than benefits to the US influence over international patent law. 
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